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FEDERALISM, VARIATION, AND STATE
REGULATION OF FRANCHISE TERMINATION
JONATHAN KLICK*
BRUCE KOBAYASHI†
LARRY RIBSTEIN‡
Abstract
This article discusses and expands on our recent work
examining the effects of franchise-termination laws. In a
prior article, we examined empirically the effect of
franchise-termination laws on the level of franchise
activity. Our analysis improved upon the prior literature in
two major ways. First, our work exploited two new sources
of panel data to provide new empirical evidence on the
effect of franchise termination laws. Second, our analysis
examined variation in states’ restrictions on the ability of
franchisors and franchisees to contract around a particular
state’s regulation. We found that the effects of termination
laws on the overall level of franchise activity are negligible
when states do not limit the parties’ ability to contract
around the laws, but become significant when states
impose such limits. Our results show that contracting
parties’ ability to exit from a state’s regulations is a
significant factor in determining the effect of regulation,
and should be taken into account by policy makers. It also
demonstrates the importance of taking state variation into
account when analyzing the effect of state regulation. This
article further examines these issues.
We discuss the
policy issues related to contractual exit from state
regulation. In addition, we present further evidence on the
effects of variation in franchise regulation by examining
the marginal effect of giving franchisees a right to cure
violations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Economists have studied several fundamental franchising issues
central to the theory of the firm.1 These include the general nature of intraversus inter-firm contracting and how contracts and incentives are used to
reduce transactions and agency costs.2 Economists have also studied how
the regulation of the contractual relationship between franchisors and
franchisees affects contracting, the organization of firms, and consumers.3
The franchisor’s ability to terminate franchisees is a central focus
of both the theoretical and empirical literature on franchise contracts and
their regulation. The franchisor's ability to terminate shirking franchisees is
an important self-enforcement mechanism for reducing monitoring and
other agency costs. But broad termination powers may allow franchisors to
opportunistically take over non-shirking franchisees. Responding to the
latter possibility, some states and the federal government enacted various
types of legislation aimed at regulating franchisor opportunism. State
regulation varies in important ways.4 Moreover, most states did not enact
statutes, choosing instead to use state contract law and state common law to
resolve such disputes.5 The federal government acted only in the specific
areas of gas stations and automobile dealers.6 Thus, the regulation of
franchise termination has remained largely a state law issue.
The variation in the states’ regulatory response, as well as the
federal government’s partial regulation of the area, is important mainly for
two reasons. First, the absence of broad federal regulation and the states’
non-uniform approach to regulating the franchise contract has enabled
1

Paul H. Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract,
21 J.L. & ECON. 223 (1978).
2
See generally, ROGER D. BLAIR & FRANCINE LAFONTAINE, THE ECONOMICS OF
FRANCHISING, (Cambridge 2005); Francine Lafontaine & Scott E. Masten, Franchise
Contracting, Organization, and Regulation: Introduction, 2 J. CORP. FIN. 1 (1995);
Benjamin Klein, The Economics of Franchise Contracts, 2 J. CORP. FIN. 9 (1995).
3
James A. Brickley, Frederick H. Dark & Michael S. Weisbach, The Economic Effects
of Franchise Termination Laws, 34 J.L. & ECON. 101 (1991); J. Howard Beales III &
Timothy J. Muris, The Foundations of Franchise Regulation: Issues and Evidence, 2 J.
CORP. FIN. 157 (1995) (examining state regulation of the franchise contract); Howard P.
Marvel, Tying, Franchising, and Gasoline Service Stations, 2 J. CORP. FIN. 199 (1995)
(examining FTC regulation of gasoline franchising); Richard L. Smith II, Franchise
Regulation: An Economic Analysis of State Restrictions on Automobile Distribution, 25
J.L. & ECON. 125 (1982); E. W. Eckard, Jr., The Effects of State Automobile Dealer
Entry Regulation on New Car Prices, 23 ECON. INQ. 223 (1985) (examining state
regulation of automobile dealers).
4
See infra Section III.
5
BLAIR AND LAFONTAINE, supra note 2 at 276-78; see Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic
Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521 (1981).
6
See Federal Automotive Dealer Franchise Act (“FADFA”), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1221-25
(2000); Petroleum Marketing Practices Act (“PMPA”), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2801-06 (2000
& Supp. 2007).

2009]

Federalism, Variation, and State Regulation of Franchise
Termination

357

economists to use this variation to measure the empirical effect of state
regulations.7 Second, state variation has allowed the forces of competitive
federalism to operate in this area.8 Franchisors have been able to use
contractual choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses to select the law and
courts of non-regulating states, thereby avoiding the effect of regulation.9
If these regulations interfere with efficient contracting, the contracting
parties’ ability to avoid regulating jurisdictions can increase welfare.
Variation in state treatment of contractual choice-of-law and choice-offorum clauses also facilitates empirical measurement of the effect of these
clauses.10
This article summarizes and extends our prior work on franchising
and the economics of federalism. Specifically, this article examines the use
of contractual choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses in franchise
contracts to avoid regulating jurisdictions. We show that firms’ ability to
use contractual choice-of-law and choice-of-forum to avoid regulating
states is an important theoretical consideration in predicting the effect of
state franchise statutes.
The article also summarizes our prior empirical work on franchise
regulation, which explicitly examines variation in states’ approaches to
regulating franchise contracts, including enforcement of choice-of-law and
choice-of-forum clauses. Consistent with our theoretical work, we find that
variations in states’ treatment of choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses
help explain the effects of state franchise regulation.
Finally, this article adds to the empirical literature on the effects of
franchise regulation by further examining variation in the franchise statutes.
Specifically, this article extends our prior work by showing the marginal
effect of a statutory right to cure.
The analysis proceeds as follows. Section II provides a brief
review of the theoretical and empirical literature on the economics of
franchising. Section III examines variation in state franchise regulation
statutes and prior empirical work on franchise regulation. Section IV
discusses the economics of federalism and the use of contractual choice-oflaw and choice-of-forum clauses in franchise contracts. Section V
summarizes our prior empirical work on franchise regulation, and extends
this analysis to examine the marginal effect of a statutory right to cure.

7

Jonathan Klick, Bruce H. Kobayashi, & Larry E. Ribstein, The Effect of Contract
Regulation: The Case of Franchising, George Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Research,
Paper No. 07-03, 2006, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=951464 (last visited Mar. 14, 2009).
8
Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Contract and Jurisdictional Freedom, in
THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 325, 348-49 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999).
9
Id.; see also infra Section IV.
10
See Klick et al., supra note 7.
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Section VI concludes this paper.

II. THE ECONOMICS OF FRANCHISE CONTRACTS
Economists have applied the insights of transaction-cost economics
to explain the use of franchising as a business form. Rubin argued that
existing explanations for the franchise form based on capital constraints
were implausible. He found more guidance in Coase’s work on the theory
of the firm,11 which better explained the franchise form of contract and
business decisions whether to franchise or own outlets.12 Drawing on the
agency cost insights of the economic literature,13 Rubin’s model of
franchising explains the decision to use the franchise form and the structure
of the franchise contract as a way to reduce monitoring costs and agency
costs. Specifically, firms use franchising in situations where direct
monitoring of the unit would be costly, as for units located far from the
franchisor.14
Moreover, the structure of the franchise contract can be explained
as an attempt by the contracting parties to generate joint surplus by
encouraging the parties to invest optimally in the franchised establishment.
The franchisee gets a share of the franchise revenues, thereby reducing the
franchisor's need to monitor the franchisee. The franchisor is also motivated
to provide on-going support, such as advertising, by receiving a share of
revenues either directly or indirectly through contractual provisions
requiring the franchisee to purchase its supplies from the franchisor, at
above marginal cost.15
11

Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
Rubin, supra note 1.
13
Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz. Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
14
James A. Brickley & Frederick H. Dark, The Choice of Organizational Form: The
Case of Franchising, 18 J. FIN. ECON. 401 (1987) (evidence supporting hypothesis that
owning versus franchising decision reflects a trade-off among agency related
problems).
15
For a formal model of this “double sided moral hazard” problem, see Sugato
Bhattacharyya & Francine Lafontaine, Double-Sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of
Share Contracts, 26 RAND. J. ECON. 761, 771-73 (1995) (showing how the need for
these incentive effects leads to linear revenue sharing formulas in franchise contracts).
For empirical studies presenting evidence consistent with the double moral hazard
model, see Francine Lafontaine, Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical
Results, 23 RAND J. ECON. 263, 275-81 (1992) (finding that the observed degree of
franchising among franchisors is consistent with this model); Francine Lafontaine &
Kathryn Shaw, The Dynamics of Franchise Contracting: Evidence from Panel Data,
107 J. POL. ECON. 1041 (1999) (using panel data on franchise contract terms to show
support for the double sided moral hazard model).
12
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The franchise contract, like any long-term contract, still gives the
parties room to act opportunistically.16 In the absence of effective
monitoring and incentives, franchisees will attempt to free ride on efforts by
the franchisor and other franchisees to maintain the brand, because they do
not bear a significant loss in the value of the franchise trademark when they
fail to uphold the franchisor’s quality standards.17
The contracting challenge this potential opportunism presents is
that it is impossible to define the franchisees' performance standards in
perfect detail under all contingencies and, therefore, impossible to enforce
these standards in court. One way to deal with this problem is through selfenforcement mechanisms that give the franchisee a positive rent stream that
will be taken away if he does not perform as expected and is terminated.18
Thus, the franchisor’s power to terminate shirking franchisees allows for
better quality control and greater total surplus, thereby making the
franchisor and franchisees collectively better off than they would be if the
franchisee had more freedom to behave opportunistically.19 Conversely,
regulation of termination clauses that prevent or delay franchisors from
disciplining underperforming franchisees by terminating their contract
would weaken the effectiveness of this self-enforcement mechanism.
However, broad termination rights have the potential to generate a
different kind of opportunism by allowing franchisors to take over
16

See generally, Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical
Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. &
ECON. 297 (1978); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 52-56 (1985); Benjamin
Klein, Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self-Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships,
34 ECON. INQ. 444 (1996).
17
See Rubin, supra note 1; Klein, supra note 2; Benjamin Klein, Transaction Costs
Determinants of ‘Unfair’ Contractual Arrangements, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 356 (1980).
18
See generally, Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in
Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981) (empirical studies of
franchise contracts are consistent with this incentive/agency model); Patrick J.
Kaufmann & Francine Lafontaine, Costs of Control: The Source of Economic Rents for
McDonald's Franchisees, 37 J.L. & ECON. 417 (1994) (showing that McDonald’s
franchisees retain ex-ante rents); James A. Brickley, Sanjog Misra & R. Lawrence Van
Horn, Contract Duration: Evidence from Franchising, 49 J.L. & ECON. 173 (2006)
(finding contract duration in franchise contracts is positively related to franchisee’s
level of specific investments); James A. Brickley, Incentive Conflicts and Contractual
Restraints: Evidence from Franchising, 42 J.L. & ECON. 745 (1999) (examining
incidence of specific contractual provisions in franchise contracts). See also Brickley &
Dark, supra note 14; James A. Brickley, Frederick H. Dark & Michael S. Weisbach, An
Agency Perspective on Franchising, 20 FIN. MGMT. 27 (1991); G. Frank Mathewson &
Ralph A. Winter, The Economics of Franchise Contracts. 28 J.L. & ECON. 503 (1985);
Seth W. Norton, Franchising, Labor Productivity, and the New Institutional
Economics, 145 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 578 (1989).
19
For an early exposition of this argument, see Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability:
A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1975).
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profitable franchises, even where the franchisee is not shirking.20 By
exercising termination rights in markets that turn out to be unexpectedly
profitable, the franchisor can expropriate returns from a non-shirking
franchisee’s investment in market discovery and development. In other
words, the franchisor can “skim the cream” by taking the franchises that
turn out to be the best. This denies the franchisee the benefits it expected
under the contract by allowing the franchisor to serve the same market
without having to split revenues with a franchisee or to profit from a resale
of the franchise.
Franchisors’ incentives to engage in opportunistic “cream
skimming” behavior can be tempered by reputational penalties.
Opportunistic franchisors will face increased costs of selling new franchises
unless the price of the franchise is lowered to reflect the increased “cream
skimming” risk. Indeed, these penalties help explain why franchise
contracts contain termination-at-will and other mechanisms for constraining
franchisee opportunism, despite the risk of opportunism by franchisors.21
Empirical evidence on franchise operations and termination suggest
that while franchisors may act opportunistically, that is not likely to be the
main reason they terminate or decide not to renew franchises.22 The “cream
skimming” theory suggests that franchisors would tend to terminate units
that become profitable unexpectedly. Yet there is evidence that one-third of
contract terminations resulted in the outlet being closed, and that contract
termination actions were likely to involve underperforming outlets.23
Moreover, since the unprofitable units cannot be sustained, the “cream
skimming” hypothesis predicts that established franchises would tend to
become company-owned over time. Yet the data show no such tendency.24

III. STATE FRANCHISE REGULATION
Concerns about franchisor opportunism led many states to limit
franchisor termination rights by statute beginning in the early 1970s.25
Between 1971 and 1992, nineteen jurisdictions enacted laws regulating

20

See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of
Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927 (1990).
21
See Klein, supra note 17, at 360.
22
See Blair & Lafontaine, supra, note 2, at 271-75.
23
Darrell L. Williams, Franchise Contract Termination: Is There Evidence of
Franchisor Abuse?, in TENTH ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY
OF FRANCHISING (A. Dugan, ed., 1996). See also BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note 2,
at 271-75.
24
Id. at 273; Lafontaine & Shaw, supra note 15.
25
Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 8; Jason Stover, No Cure, No Problem: State
Franchise Laws and Termination for Incurable Defaults, 23 FRANCHISE L. J. 217
(2004).
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franchisors’ ability to terminate franchise contracts.26 Table 1 lists the
states that have enacted general statutory restrictions on franchise
termination, non-renewal of franchise contracts, and these statutes’
substantive provisions. The states’ regulatory response varied in several
important ways. First, while nineteen jurisdictions passed general
franchise-protection statutes that regulated termination, most jurisdictions
did not do so. Second, while most statutes require good cause for a
franchisor to terminate its contract, such as violation of specific contract
terms or fraud on the part of the franchisee, two statutes require only
notice.27 Third, eleven statutes give the franchisee a right to cure any cause
for termination raised by the franchisor. Giving franchisees a right to cure
removes the threat of immediate termination and may further erode the
potential disciplinary effect of the termination threat; in addition, there are
other sources of variation. Fourth, some statutes protect franchisees from
potential encroachment of new franchises on their territory.28 Fifth, some
statutes restrict enforcement of contractual provisions waiving franchisee
protection and contracting for the applicable law and forum.29

26

Rhode Island recently enacted a statute that regulated termination of franchisees. See
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-50-4 (2007). In addition, Federal law regulates specific types of
franchise relationships—automobile franchises under FADFA (15 U.S.C. §§ 12211225), which imposes a general duty of good faith, and gasoline franchises under the
Petroleum Marketing Practices Act (“PMPA”) (15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2806). These laws
may primarily benefit franchisors to the extent that they preempt state law and thereby
protect franchisors from more onerous state regulation. However, states can enact
significant regulations beyond those contained in the federal statutes. For example,
state regulation of automobile dealerships is far more extensive that those contained in
the FADFA or the states’ general regulation of franchises enacted in almost every
jurisdiction. The PMPA did not preempt a preexisting law in Maryland that prohibits
refiner control of retail gasoline stations (MD. CODE ANN., [BUS. REG.] § 10-311
(LexisNexis 2004)), and would not prevent the enactment of similar laws in other states
(Delaware and the District of Columbia have enacted similar laws (DEL. CODE ANN., tit.
6, § 2905(a) (1974), D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-302.02 (2001)).
27
All of the statutes require that notice be given to the franchisee up to 180 days before
the relationship is terminated. In addition, the vast majority of these statutes (i.e., all
states with termination statutes except IL, MI, VA, and WA) apply to a franchisor’s
decision not to renew a franchisee’s contract as well. See supra Table 1.
28
A very restrictive encroachment provision was a unique feature of the Iowa statute,
passed in 1992. However, this provision was relaxed 1995. See IOWA CODE § 523H.6
(2007). Analyses of anti-encroachment provisions contained in state automobile dealer
regulations show that these provisions operate to prevent manufactures from solving the
successive monopoly problem, and result in higher prices to consumers. See Smith,
supra note 3; Eckard, supra note 3.
29
These variations are discussed in detail below, and are listed infra in Table 2.
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Table 1 - State Regulation of the Franchisor/Franchisee Relationship
STATE

STATUTE

CAUSE
REQUIRED
FOR
TERMINATION
YES

1. AR
(eff. 3/4/77)

AR STAT.
ANN
4-72-204

2. CA
(eff.
10/1/80;Op.
1/1/81)
3. CT
(eff.
10/1/72)

CA BUS.
& PROF.
CODE @
20020
CT GEN.
STAT. @
42-133f

YES

4. DC
(eff.
4/16/89;
repealed
4/29/98)

RIGHT TO
CURE

CAUSE
REQUIRED
FOR NONRENEWAL

NOTICE

YES*

90 days R/T

NONE**,
***-

180 days
R

YES

30 days.
10 Days if
a, b.
None if c, d,
e, f, g, h.
30 days
None if a,
c, d, e, f, g,
h.
NONE

YES

D.C.
CODE @
29-1201

YES

60 days

YES

5.DE*/*
(1970)
6.HI*/*
(1974)

6 DEL C.
@ 2552
HRS @
482E-6

YES

NONE

YES

60 days
T/R
30 days
if c
None if
d
6 mo R
if g
60 days
T/R
15 days
if c.
None if
d.
90 days

YES

Reasonable
Period

YES*

7. IA*/*
(1992)

ICA s
523H.7

YES

Reasonable
Period
None if a, c,
d, f.

YES

8. IL
(eff.
1/1/98)*/**

815 ILCS
705/19

YES

30 days,
None if a, c,
d, f.

NONE

9. IN
(eff. 7/1/76)

IN ST. 232-2.7

YES

NONE

YES*

10. MI
(eff. 10/15
/84)
11. MN
(eff. 7/1/81)

MCLA
445.1527

YES

30 days

NONE

30 days
T

MSA
s80C.14

YES

60 days
None if a, c,
d.

NONE**

12. MO
(1974)

MO ST
407.405

NONE

NONE

NONE

90 days
T
180 days
R
90 days R/T

Reasonable
Period
Reasonable
Period

30 days
T
60 days
R
90 days
R/T

OTHER
STATUTORY
RESTRICTIONS

Independent
Sourcing,
Liability for
Encroachment

Independent
Sourcing,
Liability for
Encroachment.
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13. MS
(eff. 7/1/75)

MS ST
s75-24

NONE

NONE

NONE

14. NE
(1978)

RRS Neb
@ 87-404

YES

NONE

YES

15. NJ
(eff.
12/21/71)

NJSA
56:10-5

YES

NONE

YES

16. TN
(1989)

TCA 4725-150B

YES

YES

17. VA
(1972)
18. WA
(1971)

VA ST s
13.1-564
RCWA
19.100.180

YES

30 days,
non if c, d,
f.
NONE

None if
c, d, f, h.
90 days R/T
None if
c, d, f, h.
60 days R/T
15 days
if c
None if
d, f, g, h.
60 days R/T
15 days
if c.
None if
d
60 days

NONE

NONE

NONE

30 days

19. WI
(eff. 4/5/74)

WSA
135.03

YES

YES

90 days
R/T
None if f

YES

30 days or
substantial
&
continuing
action to
cure.
None if a, c,
d, f.
60 days,
10 days if h

363

Cause
applies to
"substantial change
in competitive circumstances."

NOTES:
Exceptions:
a - Repeated failure to comply with non-discriminatory or reasonable requirements
b - Repeated failure to act in good faith/commercially reasonable manner
c - Abandonment
d - Criminal Conduct/fraud
e - Impairs Franchisor's Trademark
f - Insolvency/Bankruptcy
g - Loss of right to occupy premises
h - Failure to pay/insufficient funds/ no account check
* Not required for non-renewal reflecting reasonable/standard policies or practices
of franchisor.
** Non-Renewal cannot be for the purpose of converting franchise to franchisor
operated outlet
*** Must give franchisee opportunity to sell & franchisor has right of first refusal.
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*/* DE and HI statutes were amended, but do not know if substantive or technical.
DE amended 62 Laws 1980, ch. 352 Section 4, HI amended 1978). IA statute
applies different but similar section to franchise contracts entered into after
7/1/2000 (Section 523H.2A).
*/** Prior IL law reflecting termination, Public Act 81-426, renumbered Public Act
81-1509, effective 1980.

There is a significant question regarding the net effect of these
regulations on franchisors and franchisees. If the costs of franchisor
opportunism are likely to outweigh those of franchisee opportunism, laws
restricting termination rights could make both franchisors and franchisees
better off. For example, the law could encourage franchisees to invest more
in market discovery and development by helping franchisors make
commitments not to skim off the best franchises. However, as discussed
above, such regulations may not be necessary because of the availability of
reputational and other market forces to police franchisor opportunism.
Thus, the benefits of the laws in reducing “cream skimming” may be
outweighed by their costs in preventing franchisors from disciplining
shirking franchisees.
Given these questions regarding the net benefits of regulations,
policymakers and scholars have been interested in measuring the actual
effects of franchise regulation. Notably, Brickley et al. used the variation in
the states’ choices on whether to enact franchise protection statues that
restrict termination to test competing hypotheses regarding the effects of
these regulations.30
Using cross-sectional regression analyses, they
estimated the effect of these regulations by comparing the rate of
franchising in states with and without such franchise protection statutes.
The authors hypothesize that if termination clauses primarily discipline
franchisee cheating, the effect of termination limit laws on the rate of
franchising will be most pronounced in industries characterized by
transient, non-repeat business. Franchisors may not need the threat of
termination in industries with significant repeat business because in this
situation a franchisee that cheats on quality will lose local customers. By
contrast, franchisees that rely on the franchise itself rather than on local
reputation can impose costs on other outlets in the chain by shirking on
quality, thereby making the potential for termination more important. On
the other hand, Brickley et al. hypothesize that if termination clauses
primarily allow the franchisor to exploit the franchisee, restrictions on
termination should not have different effects across industries.31
Brickley et al. show that the effect of termination restrictions is, in
fact, greater in the industries they classify as particularly subject to nonrepeat customers (e.g., restaurants, hotels, and auto-rental agencies) than in

30
31

Brickley, supra note 3, at 117-126.
Id. at 111.
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other industries.32 Although their regressions do not show significant
differences in the fraction of franchised units to total units between
regulating and non-regulating states when all industries are included, the
effect of regulation is negative and statistically significant when only nonrepeat industries and included.33 The authors conclude that their findings
are consistent with the view that termination laws increase the costs of
franchising, and reduce efficiency by preventing the contracting parties
from optimally contracting regarding termination.34
The Brickley et al. results are consistent with a large number of
studies that have empirically demonstrated the negative effects of franchise
and dealer regulation in other contexts.35 However, there are several
limitations to the Brickley et al. empirical analysis. First, the absence of
widely available data has hindered the empirical study of the effects of
varying levels of state regulation across different chains or industries. It
may be difficult to obtain data showing the effect of the regulation on the
firm in any particular jurisdiction because neither firms nor the government
produce widely available data that show how effects vary by industry,
jurisdiction, and over time. Brickley et al.’s data, collected by the U.S.
Department of Commerce,36 did not allow them to isolate the shock of legal
changes or remove the effects of differences between industries in states
with termination restrictions and those without. Moreover, the most recent

32

Id. at 123-26.
Id. at 125.
34
Id. at 125-26. In addition, Brickley et al. perform an event study analysis of the stock
price reaction of publicly traded franchisors to passage of the California Franchisee
Protection Statues. They find that the passage of the Act was associated with
significant negative abnormal returns for these firms. They conclude that these results
are consistent with termination regulations that serve to increase the costs of
franchising. Id. at 126-30. However, while the stock market event study captures
losses to franchisors that result from the imposition of regulation, it cannot adequately
distinguish losses resulting from reduced opportunism profits from those resulting from
higher agency costs and deadweight losses from regulation.
35
These include state regulation of automobile franchises and gasoline divorcement
statutes. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 3; Eckard, supra note 3 (finding that auto dealer
regulations had anti-consumer effects); Michael G. Vita, Regulatory Restrictions on
Vertical Integration and Control: The Competitive Impact of Gasoline Divorcement
Policies, 18 J. REG. ECON. 217 (2000); John M. Barron & John R. Umbeck, The Effects
of Different Contractual Arrangements: The Case of Retail Gasoline Markets, 27 J.L. &
ECON. 313 (1984); Asher A. Blass & Dennis W. Carlton, The Choice of Organization
Form in Gasoline Retailing and the Cost of Laws That Limit That Choice, 44 J.L. &
ECON. 511 (2001) (noting the anticompetitive effects of gasoline divorcement
regulations).
36
See Beales & Muris, supra note 3; Brickley et al., supra note 3 (discussing the U.S.
Department of Commerce’s publication, Franchising in the Economy, which collected
data on franchising between 1979 and 1986).
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data from this source is now over 20 years old because the federal
government’s publication of the data ended in 1988.37
Second, the authors’ analysis does not take into account significant
differences in the regulating states’ approaches to regulation of franchise
termination, such as whether the franchisee is given a right to cure
violations and the states’ differential treatment of contractual waiver.38 The
relevant statute may allow contracts between the parties to waive the
regulation,39 apply a more permissive law to the interpretation or
enforcement of the contract,40 or to have cases arising out of the contract
adjudicated in a jurisdiction other than the one that imposes the regulation,
where the court may apply its own or a third jurisdiction’s more permissive
law.41 The potential for such bargaining and variation in states’ treatment
of such bargaining can be a significant factor in determining how state
regulations affect the franchisee-franchisor relationship.

IV. FEDERALISM AND CONTRACTUAL AVOIDANCE OF REGULATION
Even if state franchise termination regulation can harm contracting
parties, they may not do so because contracting parties have several ways to
minimize or even completely negate the effect of costly regulations,42
thereby achieving beneficial flexibility.43 Thus, the actual effect of states’
regulations on contracting parties can be trivial.44
States’ enforcement of contracts also has implications for the
effectiveness of competitive federalism. Effective regulatory competition
between states can improve the efficiency of state regulation by improving
legislators’ incentives to produce efficient law and deterring legislative
37

See, e.g., Brickley et al., supra note 3.
Existing studies have explicitly analyzed how bargaining between the parties affects
the terms of the franchise contract. See, e.g., Seth W. Norton, The Coase Theorem and
Suboptimization in Marketing Channels, 6 MARKETING SCI. 268 (1987). However,
these analyses generally have not considered bargaining over whether or not a given
state’s franchise regulations apply. For exceptions, see Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra
note 8 (discussing the effect of contractual choice of law and forum on the applicability
of state franchise regulation); Klick et al., supra note 7 (empirical evidence on the
effect of contractual waivers, choice of forum and choice of law). See also Christopher
R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation and Arbitration: An
Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEG. STUD. 549 (2003) (discussing use of
arbitration clauses).
39
See infra Table 2.
40
See infra Section IV.
41
Id.
42
See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 8. See generally, Larry E. Ribstein, From
Efficiency to Politics in Contractual Choice of Law, 37 GA. L. REV. 363 (2003).
43
See generally, Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of
Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003).
44
Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 8.
38
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wealth transfers from out of state to in state parties.45 Whether such
regulatory competition is effective depends significantly on the parties’
cost-of-exit from a given state,46 which, in turn, depends on whether the
states allow the parties to contract for the applicable court or law.
It follows that there is an important question as to how and to what
extent states allow parties to exercise contractual exit from franchise
statutes. Most obviously, the states could explicitly allow the contracting
parties to enter into an enforceable agreement waiving the statute. This is
unlikely for franchise regulation, however, because the whole purpose of
the regulation is to protect franchisees from contract provisions favorable to
franchisors. Indeed, many of the state statutes contain explicit anti-waiver
provisions.47
Still, the parties can skirt such anti-waiver provisions through
alternative contract clauses.48 In particular, the parties can provide that the
contract is to be interpreted and enforced under the law of a state that does
not regulate franchise termination. It may not be clear whether these
provisions are prohibited by statutory anti-waiver provisions, even if they
have a similar effect.
The standards the courts apply to these issues are summarized in
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187(2). It provides that a
choice-of-law clause will not be enforced as to issues such as validity
(when the choice of law matters most) if there is no “substantial
relationship” between the chosen law and the parties or transaction or other
“reasonable basis” for the parties’ choice, or application of the chosen law
would contravene a “fundamental policy” of a state with a materially
greater interest whose law would apply in the absence of an effective choice
of law by the parties.49 Thus, whether a court will enforce a choice-of-law
clause depends on the contacts between the parties and the transaction, on
one hand, and the chosen jurisdiction on the other, whether a state with
closer contacts seeks to regulate the transaction, and on the nature of the
regulation.50
The flexibility of these tests leaves the forum court significant
leeway in deciding whether to enforce the choice-of-law clause. These rules
suggest that the parties might maximize the chance that the clause will be
enforced by adding a forum-selection clause to the agreement providing
that the dispute will be decided in a particular court that has a general rule
45

Id.
See generally, Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 147 (1992); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local
Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956); BRUCE H. KOBAYASHI AND LARRY E.
RIBSTEIN, ECONOMICS OF FEDERALISM (Edward Elgar 2007).
47
See infra Table 2.
48
Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 8.
49
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) (2008).
50
Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 8.
46
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favoring enforcement or that is otherwise inclined to enforce the parties’
choice-of-law clause.51 The vast majority of jurisdictions have a general
policy favoring enforcement of choice-of-forum clauses.52 Enforceability
also has been supported by the U.S. Supreme Court,53 although these
opinions on federal issues are not necessarily binding in state courts on state
issues. One reason for the somewhat different judicial approaches to
choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses is that a court does not have to
clearly disregard local law or the law of another regulating state to hold
simply that the case should be brought in the designated forum.54 Another
is that enforcing a choice-of-law clause might force a court to apply the law
of another jurisdiction with which it may be unfamiliar and on which its
decision would not have precedential value.55 The parties’ might further
enhance the chance of enforcing the forum-selection clause with a clause
providing that the parties’ consent to jurisdiction in the designated forum.56
Because courts’ flexibility is limited, enforcing the parties’ choiceof-forum clause does not necessarily mean that the chosen forum will
enforce the parties’ contractual choice of law. Thus, a state law recognizing
enforcement of choice-of-law clauses is more permissive than a state law
recognizing enforcement only of choice-of-forum clauses.
Finally, the parties can enhance enforcement of the choice-of-law
clause by establishing connections with the designated state. As noted
above, under the general rules on enforcement of contractual choice of law,
enforcement is more likely where the parties and transaction have a
“substantial relationship” with the designated state, and where a regulating
state does not have a “materially greater interest” than the designated
state.57
Applying these rules to franchise cases, an important impetus to the
enforcement of choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses in franchise
contracts was the Supreme Court's decision in Burger King enforcing a
clause in a franchise agreement by which the franchisee consented to
jurisdiction in Florida.58 The court held that the franchisee had established
“minimum contacts” with Florida, and had agreed to a contract that had
“substantial connections with the forum state,” including a provision that
provided for application of Florida law. As a result, the Michigan
Franchise Investment Law, which required cause for termination and gave
51

Id.
Michael E. Solimine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law, 24 GA.
L. REV. 49 (1989).
53
M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.
v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
54
Ribstein, supra note 42.
55
Id.
56
Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
57
Ribstein, supra note42.
58
Burger King, supra note 53.
52
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the franchisee thirty days to cure any defects, did not govern the
relationship.59
Following this decision were two cases in the late 1980's that
enforced choice-of-law clauses. Tele-Save, decided by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, upheld a contractual choice-of-law provision
choosing New Jersey Law despite a non-waiver provision found in the Ohio
Business Opportunity Plans Act.60 Modern Computer Systems, decided by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, held that a choice-offorum clause requiring "exclusive venue in Douglas County Nebraska in
any litigation between them concerning this contract" precluded application
of the Minnesota Franchise Act in spite of the existence of an anti-waiver
provision in the statute.61
These holdings effectively enabled a franchisor to avoid franchise
regulation if it included a choice-of-law clause in the franchise contract and
established significant contacts with the designated state, or avoided
contacts with the regulating state, or both. These opinions established legal
rules for fourteen of the state statutes that existed as of the late 1980's,
which included a large percentage of the states that have enacted franchise
regulations, including the particularly oppressive laws in Iowa, Minnesota
and Arkansas in the Eighth Circuit, and Michigan in the Sixth Circuit.
On the other hand, some courts have voided contractual choice-oflaw clauses even where the relevant statute did not specifically bar the
clause. Examples include Electrical & Magneto in the Eighth Circuit62 and
Wright-Moore in the Seventh Circuit,63 which directly cover franchise
statutes in Illinois, Wisconsin and Indiana. Wright-Moore failed to find a
substantial relationship to the forum state, noting that although Ricoh was
incorporated in New York, its principal place of business was New Jersey.
Also, in contrast to the holding in Modern that the franchisee's domicile
(Minnesota) had expressed a strong preference for upholding contractual
choice of law, the court in Wright-Moore did not find such an expression by
Indiana.
Some state legislators swiftly reacted to these federal decisions.
Soon after the Eighth Circuit's decision in Modern Computer Systems, the
Minnesota legislature passed a provision explicitly voiding choice-of-law
provisions in franchise contracts by adding the phrase “including any
choice of law provision” to the section voiding waivers.64 However, there is
59

Id. For a description of the Michigan Franchise Investment Law, see Table 1, supra.
Tele-Save Merchandising Co. v. Consumers Distributing Company, Ltd., 814 F.2d
1120 (6th Cir. 1987).
61
Modern Computer Systems, Inc. v. Modern Banking Systems, Inc., 871 F.2d 734 (8th
Cir. 1989).
62
Electrical & Magneto Service Co. Inc. v. AMBAC Intern. Corp., 941 F.2d 660 (8th
Cir. 1991).
63
Wright-Moore v. Ricoh, 908 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1991).
64
MINN. STAT. § 80C.21 (2008).
60
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significant variation in the states’ responses. Since 1988, six states have
explicitly voided choice-of-forum or choice-of-law clauses. Only two,
Washington and Iowa, void both types of provisions. The California,
Illinois and Michigan statutes have provisions voiding choice-of-forum
provisions but not choice-of-law provisions. Meanwhile, the Minnesota
statute explicitly voids choice-of-law provisions but does not explicitly void
choice-of-forum provisions.
Table 2 - Statutory Restrictions on Waiver, Choice of Forum, Choice of Law,
and Applicability
States that Regulate the Franchisor/Franchisee Relationship
JURISDICTION

RESTRICTION
ON WAIVER

RESTRICTION
ON CHOICE OF
FORUM
NONE

RESTRICTION
ON CHOICE OF
LAW
NONE

CT
(2nd Circuit)

GEN. STAT. @
42-133f (f)
1975
NJSA @ 56:107(A)
1971
NONE

NONE

NONE

NONE

NONE

VA ST @ 13.1571
1972
MCLA @
445.1527 (27b)
1974

NONE

NONE

MCLA @
445.1527 (27f)
1988

NONE

TN
(6th Circuit)
IN
(7th Circuit)

TCA 47-25-1507
1989
IN. ST. @ 23-22.7-1(5)
1976

NONE
NONE

TCA 47-25-1510
1989
NONE

WI
(7th Circuit)

WSA @ 135.025
Effective
11/24/77
815 ILCS @
705/41
1988
ASA @ 4-72206(1)
1977
MSA @ 80C.21
1973

NONE

NONE

815 ILCS @
705/4
1988
NONE

NONE

NONE

MSA @ 80C.21
1989

NONE

NONE

NONE

NJ
(3rd Circuit)
DE
(3rd Circuit)
VA
(4th Circuit)
MI
(6th Circuit)

IL
(7th Circuit)
AR
(8th Circuit)
MN
(8th Circuit)

MO
(8th Circuit)

NONE

RESTRICTION ON
APPLICABILITY
GEN. ST @ 42.133h
FRANCHISE INSTATE
NJSA @ 56:10-4
FRANCHISE INSTATE
6 DEL. C. @ 2551
FRANCHISE INSTATE
VA ST. s 13.1-559
FRANCHISE INSTATE
MCLA @ 445.1504
OFFER ORIGINATES
OR RECEIVED IN
STATE OR
FRANCHISE IN
STATE
NONE
IN. ST. 23-2-2.7-1
FRANCHISE INSTATE OR RESIDENT
OF IN
WSA @ 135.02
FRANCHISE INSTATE
815 ILCS @ 7-5/19-20
FRANCHISE INSTATE
ASA @ 4-72-203
FRANCHISEE INSTATE
MSA @ 80C.19
OFFER ORIGINATES
OR RECEIVED IN
STATE OR
FRANCHISE IN
STATE
MO. ST. 407.400
FRANCHISE INSTATE
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IA
(8th Circuit)

ICA @ 523H.4
1992

ICA @ 523H.3(1)
1992

ICA @523H.14
1992

WA
(9th Circuit)

RWCA @
19.100.220
1971

RWCA @
19.100.220
1991

RWCA @
19.100.220
1991

CA
(9th Circuit)

BUS. & PROF.
CODE @ 20010
1980, (operative
1/1/1981)

BUS & PROF.
CODE @ 20040.5
1994

NONE

HI
(9th Circuit)
NE
(10th Circuit)

HRS @ 482E6(F)1974
RRS NEB. @
87-406
1978
NONE

NONE

NONE

NONE

NONE

NONE

NONE

RRS NEB. @ 87.403
FRANCHISE INSTATE
NONE

NONE

NONE

NONE

NONE

MS
(11th Circuit)
DC
(DC Circuit)

ICA @ 523H.2
FRANCHISE IN
STATE
RWCA 19.100.160
ANY PERSON
ENGAGED IN OFFER
TO SELL OR IN
BUSINESS
DEALINGS
BUS & PROF. CODE
@ 20015
FRANCHISEE
DOMICILED OR
FRANCHISE
OPERATED INSTATE
NONE

Moreover, the state legislative response still permits enforcement of
contractual choice-of-law clauses even in the states that have enacted
specific anti-choice provisions. This is because the application of these
statutes depends on the places of business of the franchisee and franchisor.
For example, in JRT the Eighth Circuit held valid the contractual choice of
Arkansas law, and affirmed the district court’s judgment, which dismissed
or granted summary judgment on the plaintiff's claims based on the
Michigan Franchise Investment Law.65 The Arkansas Franchise Law can
be used only by a franchisee that maintains a place of business in Arkansas.
Even without this statutory provision, the regulation might not apply to a
franchisor because of a lack of a “substantial relationship” between the
regulating state and the parties or transaction under the standards of
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts §187(2).66 Franchisors, therefore, can
minimize the impact of state franchise regulations by locating franchises
only in non-regulating states and by locating headquarters either in nonregulating states or in regulating states that apply their provisions only to
in-state franchisees.

65
66

JRT v. TCBY Yogurt, 52 F.3d 734 (8th. Cir. 1995).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (2008).

372

ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LAW
JOURNAL

[Vol. 3:2

Table 3 - Applicable State Franchise Termination Laws
by Franchisor's Principal Place of Business and Franchisee’s State
Franchisor’s Principal Place of Business and Contractual Choice of Law
Franchisee’s
State
(Circuit):
Non Reg.
State:
AR(8)

NonReg.
State

AR
(8)

CA
(9)

CT
(2)

DE
(3)

HI
(9)

IA
(8)

IL
(7)

IN
(7)

(5)

(1)

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

AR

N

N

N

N

N

S

S

N
(2,B)

(1)

(1)

(1,2)

MI
(6)

MN
(8)

N/y

N/y

N/y

N/y

(H,I)

(2)

NE
(8)
N

NJ
(3)

TN
(6)

VA
(4)

WA
(9)

WI
(7)

(1)

(1)

N

N/y

N

N/y

N

N

N

N

N

N/y

S

CA(9)

N

N

CA

-

-

-/y

N

Y

Y

N/y

N/y

N

-

N/y

-/y

-/y

Y

CT (2)

N

N

-

CT

-

-

N

Y

Y

N

N

N

-

N

-

-

Y

DE (3)

N

N

-

-

DE

-

N

Y

Y

N

N

N

-

N

-

-

Y

HI (9)

N

N

-

-

-

HI

N

S

S

N

N

N

-

N

-

-

Y

IA(8)

Y
(4)

Y

(4)

Y

Y

Y

(4)

Y

(4)

IA

Y
(4)

Y

(4)

Y

(4)

Y

(4)

Y

(4)

Y

(4)

Y

(4)

Y

(4)

Y

(4)

(4)

IL(7)

S

S

Y

Y

Y

Y

S

IL

Y

S/y

S/y

S

Y

S

Y

Y

Y

IN(7)

S

S

Y

Y

Y

Y

S

Y

IN

S/y

S/y

S

Y

S/y

Y

Y

Y

MI(6)

N
(2)

N

(1,2,E)

N

N

N

N

N

S

S

MI

N/y

N

N

N

N

N/y

S

MN(8)

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

(4)

(4)

(4)

(4)

(4)

(4)

Y

MN

(4,E)

(4)

(4)

(4)

(4)

(4)

NE(8)

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

S

S

N/y

N/y

NE

N

N

N

N/y

S

NJ(3)

N

N

-/y

-/y

-/y

-/y

N

Y

Y

N/y

N/y

N

NJ

N/y

-/y

-/y

Y

TN (6)

Y
(4)

Y

(4)

Y

Y

Y

(4)

Y

(4)

Y

(4)

Y

(4)

Y

(4)

Y

(4)

Y

(4)

Y

(4)

Y

(4)

TN

Y

(4)

Y

(4)

Y

(4)

VA (4)

N

N

-

-

-

-

N

Y

Y

N

N

N

-

N

VA

-

Y

WA(9)

Y
(4)

(4)

Y

Y

(4,K)

(4)

Y

Y

(4)

(4)

(4)

(4)

(4)

(4)

(4)

(4)

(4)

(4)

(4)

Y

WA

Y

WI(7)

S

S

Y

Y

Y

Y

S

Y

Y

S

S

S

Y

S

Y

Y

WI

(2,C)

(3,F)

(4.L)

(2,B)

(3,F)

(2,B)

(4,J)

(2,B)

(4)

(4)

(4)

(4)

(4)

(4)

Y

Y

(2,B)

(1,2)

Y

(2,B)

Y

(O)

Y

Y

Y

Y

(3,D)

(2)

Y

Y

(2,B)

(1,2)

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

(4)

Table Entries:
Y - Franchise Law of Franchisee’s State applies.
Y - One Circuit has voided Choice of Law Clause
N - Both Circuits have Enforced Choice of Law Clause, or No Franchise Law
Exists in Franchisee State
N - One Circuit has Enforced Choice of Law Clause.
S - One Circuit has Enforced Choice of Law, Other has not.
/y - Franchise Law of Franchisor’s State may apply to out of state franchisee.
Notes:
1

Franchise statute does not apply to out-of-state franchisee by statute (See Table 3)
Contractual choice of law enforced over general waiver in the absence of explicit
anti-choice of law clause
3
General waiver voids contractual choice of law or forum
4
Explicit anti-choice of law clause voids contractual choice of law
5
No regulations apply in either state.
2

Specific Cases:
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Modern Computer Systems v. Modern Banking, 871 F.2d 734 (8th Cir. 1989)
(applied contractual choice of NE law over Minnesota Franchise Act (MFA), but
prior to amendment adding explicit anti-COL clause to MFA). DeLaria v. KFC
Corp., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21516 at *17 (D. Minn) (interpreting amendment to
MFA as legislative response to Modern).
B
Following Eighth Circuit holdings in Modern Computer and JRT upholding
contractual choice absent specific provisions in statute.
C
Cottman Transmission System v. Melody, 869 F. Supp. 1180 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(upholding contractual choice of Pennsylvania Law over California Franchise
Regulation).
D
Hengel, Inc. v. Hot N’ Now, 825 F. Supp. 1311 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (Franchisor
successfully argues that its choice of MI law is void to avoid application of
Michigan Franchise Investment Law (MFIL) by a IL franchisee – waiver provision
in ILCS invalidates contractual choice of MI law); See also To-Am Equipment Co.,
Inc. v. Mitsubishi Caterpillar Forklift America, Inc., 152 F.3d 658 (C.A.7 (Ill.)
1998); Bixby's Food Systems, Inc. v. McKay 193 F.Supp.2d 1053 (N.D. Ill. 2002);
Healy v. Carlson Travel Network Associates, Inc. 227 F.Supp.2d 1080 (D. Minn.
2002) (ILCS applied over Minnesota Franchise Statute for IL franchisee with MN
choice of law).
E
JRT v. TCBY Yogurt, 52 F.3d 734 (C.A.8. (Ark.) 1995) (Enforced choice of AR
law over MFIL; AR Franchise law does not apply to MI franchisee).
F
Wright-Moore v. Ricoh, 908 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1990) (Applying IN franchise
statute over choice of NY law). Morley-Murphy Co. v. Zenith Elec. Corp., 142 F.3d
373, 381 (7th Cir. 1998) (Wisconsin law).
G
Electrical & Magneto Service Co. v. AMBAC, 941 F.2d 660 (8th Cir. 1991)
(applying MO franchise law over choice of SC law).
H
Banek v. Yogurt Ventures, 6 F.3d 357 (6th Cir. 1993) (Enforcing choice of GA
law, dismissing claims under MFIL).
I
Tele-Save Merch. V. Consumers Dist. Co., 814 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1987).
J
TCBY v. RSP, 33 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 1994) (Enforced choice of AK law, dismissing
claims under MFA because anti-choice of law clause did not apply retroactively).
K
Rutter v. BX of Tri-Cities, Inc., 806 P.2d 1266 (C.A. Wash. 1991) (Apply WA
Franchise Law over choice of CA law).
L
Carlock et al., v. Pillsbury, 719 F. Supp. 791 (D. Minn. 1989) (uphold choice of
NY law over MFA).
M
Tri-County Retreading v. Bandag, Inc., 851 S.W. 2d 780 (C.A. Mo. 1993)
(upholding choice of IA law).
N
Flynn Beverage Inc., v. Joseph E. Segram & Sons, 815 F. Supp. 1174 (C.D. Ill.,
1993) (applying IL law over choice of law).
O
Great Frame-Up Syst., Inc. v. Jazayeri Ent., 789 F. Supp. 253 (N.D. Ill. 1992)
(Apply CA statute over choice of IL law).
Volvo Const. Equipment North America, Inc. v. CLM Equipment Company, Inc.,
386 F.3d 581 (C.A.4 (N.C.) 2004) (Finding that AR waiver provision was
fundamental policy (based on legislative statement), but LA was not (no antiwaiver
provision)).
Cromeens, Holloman, Sibert, Inc v. AB Volvo, 349 F.3d 376 (C.A.7 (Ill.) 2003)
(finding anti-waiver fundamental public policy of Maine based on legislative
statement).
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V. THE EFFECT OF TERMINATION RESTRICTIONS
In empirical work we sought to address the shortcomings of the
earlier work on franchise termination regulation.67 This analysis exploits
two new sources of panel data to analyze the effects of laws restricting
franchisor termination rights, allowing us to avoid the limitations present in
prior studies that relied on cross-sectional data. We also explicitly examine
the effect of variation in states’ statutory treatment of contractual choice-oflaw and choice-of-forum clauses.
Our first set of empirical tests used newly collected firm-level
UFOC data on franchising in the fast-food industry to examine the effect of
the most recently enacted franchise legislation in Iowa. Because of data
limitations, this data covers the period only from 1989-2001,68 when only
one new statute, in Iowa, was passed. Enacted in 1992, the Iowa statute is
uniformly regarded as the most unfavorable to franchisors.69 In addition to
preventing termination at will, it requires that franchisors allow franchisees
a right to cure defects, it restricts encroachment, and it explicitly restricts
waiver and enforcement of contractual choice-of-law and choice-of-forum
clauses. Our results show that the passage of this statute led to a reduction
in both the number of franchised units and the total number of chain
outlets.70 In other words, the increase in the number of franchisor-operated
establishments did not offset the decrease in the number of franchised
outlets.
While data limitations do not allow us to examine the issue of
contractual avoidance of the statute, these results illustrate how a measure
of overall activity level (i.e., the number of total outlets in a given state) can
be used to measure the effects of a franchise regulation. In order to
measure the effects of other state law changes, including parties’ ability to
bargain over whether the franchise regulations apply, we analyze a second
dataset that uses state employment in industries characterized by a high
degree of franchising as a proxy for the overall franchisor activity level.71
This dataset, from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, contains data from
67

Klick et al., supra note 7.
Id.
69
See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 339.
70
Klick et al., supra note 7 at Tables 2 & 3.
71
Id. Specifically, we collected data on the proportion of employees in a state
employed in four SIC codes that historically have a relatively high rate of franchising.
These include automotive dealers and service stations (624), eating and drinking places
(627), hotels and other lodging places (805), and automotive repair, services, and
parking (825). In addition, to allow us to control for variables that are coincidentally
correlated with the enactment of franchise termination that affect employment in
franchising industries, we also collected data on the proportion of employees in a state
employed in four SIC codes where there was a low rate of franchising. These include
contractors (310), lumber products (413), textiles (462), and depository institutions
(710).
68
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1969 to 2000. Because the dataset covers the period when all nineteen
statutes listed in Table 1 were enacted, it is rich enough to analyze the
contractual avoidance issue.72
Using this data, we find that employment in franchise industries, as
a proportion of total employment, drops significantly when states enact
restrictions on franchisor termination rights.73 The negative effect is larger
in industries that typically do not have repeat business, bolstering the
inference that the statutes limit franchisors' ability to police franchisee
opportunism.74 These results complement the direct test based on the
UFOC data, which supports the view that these termination statutes serve to
reduce overall activity in franchise industries.
We find that statutory variations as to whether the parties can
directly waive their application or effectively contract over the applicable
law or forum are important. Controlling for these variables, termination
restrictions, by themselves, do little to affect behavior. But termination
restrictions coupled with restrictions on the franchisee’s ability to waive its
rights have a significant and negative effect on franchising. Specifically,
we find that the effect on employment is larger when states restrict the
parties’ ability to contract around these restrictions through waiver, choiceof-law, and choice-of-forum clauses.75
The prior empirical literature franchising has generally ignored
state-by-state substantive variation in the statutes. One exception is Muris
& Beales, who examined the additional effect of statutory provisions that
give franchisees a right to cure violations on the franchise/own decision.76
As noted above,77 eleven states with franchise-termination restrictions also
require that a franchisor permit the franchisee to cure any problem offered
as cause for terminating their relationship. Because giving the franchisee a
right to cure further limits the franchisor’s ability to discipline franchisee
opportunism, such statutory restrictions should have a marginal effect on
the franchise-versus-own decision. Like the Brickley et al. study, the Muris
& Beales study was based on cross-sectional data collected by the
Department of Commerce.78 In contrast to the findings in Brickley et al.,79
Muris & Beales found that the right to cure had negative and significant
effects in both repeat and non-repeat industries, though the largest negative
effects on franchising were in non-repeat industries, concentrated in states
where the statute mandated a franchisee right to cure.
72

Id.
Id. at Table 6.
74
Id. at Table 7; see also Brickley et al., supra note 3.
75
Klick et al., supra note 7 at Tables 8-9.
76
Timothy J. Muris & J. Howard Beales III, State Regulation of Franchise Contracts,
unpublished manuscript, (1994).
77
See Table 1.
78
See discussion in supra note 36.
79
Brickley et al., supra note 3.
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These results suggest that the right to cure is an important statutory
variation, and it may be an important factor in determining the effect of
franchise regulations. Table 5 reports the results of regressions that
investigate the effect of a right to cure using the employment panel data set
from Klick et al.80 To estimate the effects of franchise regulations on
employment in franchise industries, we performed a difference-indifference-in-difference (“DDD”) analysis in which we independently
control for state-specific year dummies (υ) to net out any unobservable
variables that affect this segment of the workforce. Additionally, we
control for industry-specific state fixed effects (λ) and industry-specific
year dummies (τ) generating the following regression:

employmentist
= ∑ j α j law jist + λis + τ it + υ st
employmentst
where i represents the industry, s stands for the state, and t is the year.81
We identify the effects of franchise termination laws by examining
changes in the portion of the state’s workforce in franchising industries
when termination laws are adopted. This change is reflected in the
coefficient of the law variables, and is measured relative to non-franchising
industries in the same state and year. This change is also net of any existing
baseline within the state and any contemporaneous changes in franchising
industries in states without termination laws. In regressions that do not take
into account substantive variation in termination laws, there is a single law
variable that equals one if the state s in year t has a franchise termination
statute in effect. Our approach allows for multiple law variables to take
into account state variation.
Table 4
Effect of Cure Requirement in Franchising Relationship

Termination
80

(robust standard errors in parentheses)
[standard errors clustered by state in brackets]
Results without
Average
Effect of Cure
Effect of Cure
Incremental
Requirement
Requirement
Effect of Cure
Interacted with
Requirement
Other Contract
Restrictions
-0.00012
0.00039
0.00141

Termination
Restriction and
Cure Requirement
Only
-0.00051

Klick et al., supra note 7.
We estimate this equation using weighted least squares where each observation is
weighted by the total labor force in the state. In this regression, the law variables only
take the value of one in states with termination laws for those industries assumed to
have a high degree of franchising, in order to avoid collinearity with the state year
dummies. In addition, we use robust standard errors to allow for heteroskedasticity
across states. We also provide standard errors that are clustered by state to mitigate
concerns about serial correlation.

81
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(0.00027)
[0.00090]

(0.00031)
[0.00086]

(0.00050)***
[0.00062]**

(0.00024)**
[0.00073]

--

--

-0.00087
(0.00034)***
[0.00093]

--

-0.00107
(0.00023)***
[0.00071]

-0.00059
(0.00026)**
[0.00075]

-0.00141
(0.00039)***
[0.00084]

--

Termination and
Waiver Restriction
and Cure Requirement
Only

--

--

-0.00122
(0.00029)***
[0.00100]

--

Termination, Waiver,
and either COL or
COF Restriction

-0.00204
(0.00028)***
[0.00101]**

-0.00145
(0.00032)***
[0.00095]

-0.00102
(0.00033)***
[0.00101]

--

Termination, Waiver,
and COL or COF
Restriction and Cure
Requirement

--

--

-0.00229
(0.00032)***
[0.00118]*

--

Termination, Waiver,
and COL and COF
Restriction

-0.00306
(0.00042)***
[0.00132]**

-0.00222
(0.00047)***
[0.00118]*

--

--

Termination, Waiver,
and COL and COF
Restriction and Cure
Requirement

--

--

-0.00288
(0.00041)***
[0.00134]**

--

Cure Requirement

--

-0.00083
(0.00033)**
[0.00107]

--

-0.00123
(0.00031)***
[0.00102]

Termination
Restriction and Cure
Requirement Only
Termination and
Waiver Restriction
Only

Note: Weighted least squares regressions are presented; each observation is
weighted by total state employment. All regressions include Industry-specific
year and state effects, as well as state-specific year effects. These are not
reported for expositional clarity.
R2 = .980
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10 (two-sided test of null hypothesis that
coefficient equals 0).

Table 4 reports several regressions that examine state variation in
franchise protections statutes. The results in column 1 show the effect of
contractual waiver, choice-of-law, and choice-of-forum provisions reported
in Klick et al.82 As discussed supra, permitting enforcement of these
provisions increases the contracting parties’ ability to avoid regulation.
This analysis shows the importance of taking these contractual variations
into account when measuring the effect of regulation. The results in
Column 1 show that termination restrictions alone have very little effect on
82

See Klick et al. supra note 7 at Table 8, column 2.
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the employment share of franchise industries. The coefficient on the
“termination restriction only” variable is small in magnitude and is not
statistically significant. Adding a “waiver restriction” variable increases the
negative effect of the termination by a factor of ten. And adding either a
“choice of law” or “choice of forum restriction” variable doubles the
negative effect generated by the waiver restriction. This effect is
statistically significant using robust standard errors and using standard
errors clustered by state. Finally, states that restrict both choice-of-law and
choice-of-forum have the largest negative effect on employment.
The second column of Table 4 provides estimates from re-running
the above regression, adding an additional variable that equals one for
franchise industries operating in states that have a cure requirement in a
given year. In this specification, we do find a negative average treatment
effect for the cure requirement. The effect is statistically significant at the
five percent level with robust standard errors, but is not statistically
significant when standard errors are clustered by state.
We also present a specification in column 3 that interacts the cure
requirement indicator with each of the various groupings of state
contractual restrictions (i.e., termination restriction only, termination and
waiver restrictions only, termination, waiver, and either COL or COF
restrictions only, and all of the restrictions). We again find evidence that
the cure requirement independently reduces the employment share of
franchising industries and, in general, that this effect is larger in magnitude
as states adopt more restrictions on the parties’ ability to contract around
state law. The last column of Table 5 examines the effect of cure in the
absence of the contractual avoidance variables, and is closest to the Muris
& Beales results.83 The regression results show that a right to cure
marginally increases the negative effect of the franchise termination
statutes. The effect is statistically significant with robust standard errors,
but neither of the variables’ coefficients are significant with standard errors
clustered by state.

V. CONCLUSION
Prior empirical studies of franchise termination regulations show
that those regulations reduce the use of franchising. These studies, in
effect, assume that franchise regulations have uniform effects on
franchising. In this paper, we argue that such an approach ignores
significant variation in states’ approaches to franchise regulation. We show
that a state’s approach to allowing parties contractually to avoid regulation
is a significant factor in determining the actual effect of regulation, and
should be taken into account by policy makers and by those analyzing the
effects of state regulation. We also provide evidence that the substantive
83

Muris & Beales, supra note 79.
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provisions of franchise regulation statutes, such as the right to cure, can
have important effects in determining the impact of the regulation.
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